The coalition and constitutional reform by Bogdanor, Vernon
19
Amicus Curiae Issue 86 Summer 2011
Britain is currently experiencing her first peacetimecoalition government since the 1930s, a coalitionwhich arose out of her first hung Parliament since
1974. It was an unexpected outcome. Previously coalitions
have arisen not from hung Parliaments, but from national
emergencies – war in 1915, 1916 and 1940, financial
emergency in 1931. In the past, hung Parliaments, as in
1923, 1929 and 1974, have led to short-lived minority
governments, not coalitions.
Not only is the formation of a peacetime coalition
following a hung Parliament a constitutional innovation,
but the coalition promised a whole raft of constitutional
reforms, the most important of which are fixed-term
Parliaments and a directly elected second chamber,
together with the referendum on the alternative vote
method of election, held in May 2011. Indeed, the Deputy
Prime Minister, Nick Clegg, declared in a speech shortly
after the formation of the coalition, on 19 May 2010, that
its constitutional reforms amounted to:
“the most significant programme of empowerment by a British
government since the great enfranchisement of the 19th
century…The biggest shake-up of our democracy since 1832,
when the Great Reform Act redrew the boundaries of British
democracy, for the first time extending the franchise beyond
the landed classes.”
It is already apparent that the era of constitutional
reform, which began with the Blair government in 1997,
and which I tried to chart in my book, The New British
Constitution, published in 2009, is not yet complete.
Reform of the constitution is most definitely a process, not
an event.
The Coalition Agreement, published on the formation
of the government, declared:
“Our political system is broken. We urgently need
fundamental political reform, including a referendum on
electoral reform, much greater co-operation across party lines,
and change to our political system to make it far more
transparent and accountable.”
This belief that the political system is “broken” is in
large part a reaction to revelations of the abuse of expenses
of 2009. In the third reading debate on the Parliamentary
Constituencies and Voting Bill, Nick Clegg declared:
“I am sure I do not need to remind Members of the damage
that was done by the expenses scandal, which lifted the lid on
a culture of secrecy, arrogance and remoteness, right at the
heart of the democracy. The coalition Government are
determined to turn the page on that political culture and give
people a political system they can trust” (House of Commons
Debates, 2 November 2010, col 802).
In July 2010, the government published two major Bills
providing for constitutional change with regard to House
of Commons elections – a Parliamentary Voting System
and Constituencies Bill, and a Fixed-Term Parliaments Bill.
In addition it committed itself to a wholly or mainly
directly elected House of Lords, a Localism Bill,
decentralizing power to local authorities and local
communities, and a European Union Bill requiring a
referendum before future treaty amendments or significant
transfers of power to the European Union can be ratified.
This Bill would also contain a declaratory clause reiterating
that Parliament was sovereign.
PARLIAMENTARY VOTING AND
CONSTITUENCIES BILL
The Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies
Bill provided for three reforms. They were:
(i) A reduction in the number of MPs from 650 to a fixed
number of 600.
(ii) A new set of rules to be used by the Boundary
Commissions to ensure greater equalization of con-
stituency boundaries, and more frequent boundary
reviews.
(iii) A referendum on the alternative vote method of elec-
tion to the House of Commons, which was held on the
first Thursday of May in 2011, and which resulted in a
defeat for the proposal by a majority of around two to
one on a turnout of around 42 per cent.
In 1950, the House of Commons had contained 625
MPs. By 2010, this number had grown to 650, even though
the devolved bodies had taken over many of the
constituency responsibilities of Scottish, Welsh and
Northern Irish MPs. Nevertheless, population growth and
the lowering of the voting age to 18 mean that the average
MP represents a far larger constituency today than in 1950.
In 1950, the total electorate was 34,412,255. By 2005, it
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had grown to 45,610,369, an increase of around 30 per
cent. In 1945, the average MP represented a constituency
of around 66,000; today the figure is around 96,000;
following the reduction it will be around 105,000, a 60 per
cent increase since 1945. This increase has caused an
increase in the workload of MPs.
Moreover, constituents are far more demanding of their
MPs than they were 60 years ago, a period of deference
when many MPs visited their constituency somewhat
infrequently. In the 1930s, one MP’s “conscientious
approach to local interests in Lanark puzzled Collins [Sir
Godfrey Collins, Secretary of State for Scotland, 1932-36].”
Asked how often he visited his constituency in Greenock,
Collins replied: “Five times in 30 years” (D R Thorpe, Alec
Douglas-Home, Sinclair Stevenson 1996, p 54). Clement
Attlee refused to conduct a constituency surgery on the
grounds that it dealt with local matters, whereas his task was
to concern himself with matters of high policy at
Westminster. In the 1950s, Hugh Gaitskell, Shadow
Chancellor and then Leader of the Opposition, received just
20 letters a month from constituents. One of his colleagues,
Charles Pannell, the MP for West Leeds, never held a
constituency surgery at all (Philip M. Williams, Hugh
Gaitskell, Jonathan Cape, 1979, p 380; Brian Brivati, Hugh
Gaitskell, Richard Cohen Books, 1996, p 158). It is unlikely
that there are any MPs who do not hold constituency
surgeries today. They have become, in effect, ombudsmen
for their constituents, intermediaries between their
constituents and an increasingly complex administration. A
reduction in the number of MPs could, therefore, lead to
some alienation on the part of constituents lost in the
thickets of modern administration.
If there are fewer MPs, but the number of ministers
remains the same, then legislative scrutiny will be weaker.
Even without the proposed reduction in the number of
MPs, there would be a strong case for reducing the
statutory maximum number of ministers entitled to sit and
vote in the House of Commons. In 1900, when Britain
ruled an empire covering a quarter of the world, there
were just 60 ministers. By 1950, this had increased to 81,
and by January 2010, 119. While the Cabinet increased
only from 19 in 1900 to 23 in 2010, the number of
ministers below Cabinet rank increased from 41 in 1900 to
96 in 2010. Over a quarter of Conservative and Liberal
Democrat MPs were ministers. A further 32 MPs were
Parliamentary Private Secretaries. The average cost of each
minister, including secretaries, offices etc. is apparently
around £500,000, as well as “tying down a lot of civil
service resources” (House of Commons Public
Administration Select Committee, Too Many Ministers?, 9th
Report, 2009-10, HC 457, para 16). The former Cabinet
Secretary, Lord Turnbull, told the Commons Public
Administration Committee in January, 2010 that the
number of ministers could be reduced by 50 per cent.
In a speech to the Institute for Government in January
2010, Nick Clegg proposed that, in addition to a reduction
in the number of MPs to 500, the number of ministers in
both houses should be cut to 73. Nevertheless, on 25
October 2010, the coalition government resisted an
amendment to reduce the statutory maximum number of
MPs in the Commons under the House of Commons
Disqualification Act and the Ministerial and Other Salaries
Act, both of 1975, from 95 to 87, directly reflecting the
percentage reduction in the number of MPs. But David
Heath, Deputy Leader of the House of Commons,
declared that “it is likely that at some stage in the future we
will reduce the number of Ministers” (House of Commons
Debates, 25 October 2010, col 129).
THE EQUALISING OF CONSTITUENCIES
The second proposal embodied in the Parliamentary
Voting System and Constituencies Act provides for new
rules to be used by the Boundary Commissions. The
current rules, originally established in 1944 in the House
of Commons (Redistribution of Seats) Act, and
subsequently amended and consolidated in various later
Acts of Parliament, provide for Boundary Commissions for
England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The
Commissioners are required to define an electoral quota
for their territory by dividing the total number of electors
by the number of constituencies. Largely for historical
reasons, there is a different electoral quota for each of the
four territories in the United Kingdom. In 2010, the
average constituency electorate in each of the four
territories was:
England 71,882
Scotland 65,498
Northern Ireland 63,101
Wales 56,545
Once the Commissioners have defined a quota, they are
then required to make recommendations for constituency
boundaries according to a complex set of rules, which, so
it has been argued, are “ambiguous and unclear, and so
invite inconsistency in treatment”(D.J. Rossiter, R.J.
Johnston and C.J. Pattie, The Boundary Commissions:
Redrawing the UK’s Map of Parliamentary Constituencies,
Manchester University Press, 1999, p 400). Equality of
constituencies is just one of these rules, rule 5, which
declares that “the electorate of any constituency shall be as
near the electoral quota as is practicable”, but this rule is
not given primacy. There are in consequence large
variations in constituency size. Once the Commissioners
have published their conclusions, there is provision for a
public inquiry if a local authority or more than 100
electors object to a particular recommendation. The
process is time-consuming, and the last boundary review in
England took seven years to complete. In consequence,
even after a boundary review, constituency sizes fail to
register recent population changes. In 2010, the electoral
register was based on figures from the year 2000. Because20
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population movement is in general from Labour-voting
inner cities to Conservative-voting rural areas and the
more marginal suburbs, deficiencies in the boundary
review process generally work to the disadvantage of the
Conservatives (Michael Balinski, Ron Johnston, Iain
McLean and Peyton Young, Drawing a New Constituency Map
for the United Kingdom: The Parliamentary Voting System and
Constituencies Bill, 2010, British Academy Policy Centre,
2010, p.29).
The Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill
seeks to secure equal constituencies, an ideal first put
forward by the Chartists nearly 200 years ago. It provides
that, instead of quotas for the four territories of the United
Kingdom, there will be a single quota for the whole country,
and primacy will be given to the rule that every constituency
must have an electorate within just 5 per cent of the quota
(with the exception of the Orkney and Shetland Islands,
Comhairle nan Eilean Siar (the Western Isles), and also the
Isle of Wight). Public inquiries are to be abolished, but the
period of public consultation is to be extended from 4 to 12
weeks. The first review under the rules will be completed by
October 2013, which is 18 months before the end of the
2010 Parliament and the proposed date of the next general
election. But the review will be based on the December 2010
electoral roll, and therefore, if the next election is held in
2015, the boundaries will still be over four years out of date.
Subsequent reviews are to be completed at five year intervals,
so that each review will occur 18 months before the date of
the general election if Parliament runs its full term.
The reform has been criticized on the ground that, while
the old rules provided for community feeling, the new ones
give primacy to numerical equality. An opposition Labour
spokesman, Chris Bryant, argued that:
“A system that delivers mathematical perfection may be
aseptically clean, and please the tidy utilitarian and the
centralist, but it will in countless cases leaves voters on the
wrong side of a river, a mountain, a county or ward
boundary, or cultural divide, and, thereby fail the
fundamental tests that we should be setting” (House of
Commons Debates, 1 November 2010, col 657).
A Liberal Democrat, MP, Andrew George, representing
a Cornish constituency, predicted that:
“When people wake up to the full reality of the way the
boundaries are to be divided, they will understand that it will
result in the effective pasteurization of Parliamentary
constituencies. They will be homogenized and we will see the
denigration of place, the denigration of identity and the
promotion of placelessness and bland uniformity” (House of
Commons Debates, 1 November 2010, col 680).
“Constituencies”, James Callaghan, declared, as Home
Secretary in 1969, “are not merely areas bounded by a line
on a map; they are living communities with a unity, a history
and a personality of their own” (House of Commons Debates,
19 June 1969, col. 742).
It may be that voters would prefer to be under-repre-
sented rather than abandon strong community ties in the
interests of “the tyranny of arithmetic.”
Regular and more frequent boundary reviews will only
achieve the aim of equalizing constituencies if the electoral
register is efficient. If the register does not include all those
eligible and if the inefficiencies are not random but skewed
towards one particular type of constituency, then that type
of constituency will find itself under-represented. The
Electoral Commission has calculated that the register is
only around 90 per cent efficient, and that around 3
million people who ought to be on it, and indeed are legally
required to ensure that they are on it, are in fact excluded.
These absent names comprise primarily the young,
students and members of ethnic minorities, who are more
likely to live in inner city and Labour-voting constituencies
than in the countryside.
On the Commission’s figures, the number of missing
voters exceeded the majority of the sitting MP in 2005 in
160 seats. The Commission found that the lowest rates of
completeness and accuracy of the register were in two
densely populated areas with highly mobile populations,
Lambeth, and the city of Glasgow, chosen as case studies.
The report suggested that there were around 100,000
unregistered voters in these two areas. Glasgow would be
almost certainly entitled to six constituencies rather than
the five which it would be given on the numbers in the
current register. Until the register becomes more efficient,
therefore, there will be fewer inner city constituencies than
there ought to be (Electoral Commission, The Completeness
and Accuracy of Electoral Registers in Great Britain, March
2010).
The government has announced that it will produce
proposals for individual registration in an attempt to deal
with this problem.
In the 2010 general election, it took more votes to elect
a Conservative MP than a Labour MP. The electorate in
seats won by Labour is on average smaller than the
electorate in seats won by the Conservatives. The figures
were:
Labour 69,145
Conservative 73,031
There are five reasons for this disparity.
The first reason is that Wales is over-represented and
Scotland slightly over-represented as compared with
England at Westminster. The electoral quotas for Wales and
Scotland have been determined independently from that in
England. Wales has been over-represented in relation to
England relative to her share of the United Kingdom
electorate since 1945, and this probably yields around four
extra seats to Labour. Scotland was similarly over-
represented until it was given legislative devolution in the
1998 Scotland Act, when her representation was intended
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to be reduced to the English level. Even so, Scotland
remains slightly over-represented. Northern Ireland was
deliberately under-represented at Westminster during the
first period of devolution from 1920 to 1972, but this
precedent was not followed in the case of Scotland.
The second reason for the disparity is that the average
size of constituencies in England represented by
Conservative MPs is larger than the average size of those
represented by Labour MPs, precisely because the
boundary reviews have failed to keep up with population
movements. Between 2001 and 2005, for example, the
electorate grew by around 1,000 votes in the average
Conservative constituency but fell by around 500 in the
average Labour constituency. In 2010, the average size of
constituencies won by the Conservatives had 3,886 more
names on the electoral register than the average Labour
constituency.
In 2010 this difference in constituency electorates was
worth 18 seats to Labour out of the total of the 54 extra
seats that Labour would have won if its vote had been equal
to that of the Conservatives. This, however, means that
variations in electorate size cannot be used to explain the
whole of the total bias of the electoral system against the
Conservatives. Such variations, it has been said, “have
contributed no more than one-third of the total bias”
(Balinski et al, Drawing a New Constituency Map, pp 30-1).
What are the other reasons for it?
There are three other factors, which cannot be remedied
by any redistribution of constituencies, however speedy
and efficient. The first factor is that turnout is higher in
Conservative than in Labour constituencies – 68.4 per cent
as compared to 61.1 per cent in 2010. On average, 4,161
more voters turn out in a Conservative constituency than
in a Labour constituency. If one adds this to the 3,886
more names on the electoral register in Conservative
constituencies, differential turnout means that the average
Conservative constituency contains 8,047 more voters
than the average Labour constituency. Differential turnout
probably accounted for 32 of the 54 extra seats that Labour
would have won if its vote had been equal to that of the
Conservatives.
A second factor which has disadvantaged the
Conservatives in recent elections, though not in 2010, is
that the Labour vote has been more concentrated than the
Conservative vote and therefore better distributed from
the point of view of winning seats. The Liberal Democrat
vote is the least concentrated of that of the three major
parties. In elections before 2010, Labour won more seats
than the Conservatives by narrow majorities and wasted
fewer votes building up large majorities in safe seats or
coming a good second. Therefore it won a larger number
of seats than the Conservatives for any given share of the
vote. In 2010, for purely contingent reasons, there seems
to have been no geographical effect of this sort between the
major parties.
The final factor has been the differential effect of tactical
voting. In 2010, Labour voters proved more willing to vote
Liberal Democrat in Conservative/Liberal Democrat
marginals, than Conservative voters were to vote Liberal
Democrat in Labour/Liberal Democrat marginals. This
differential effect probably cost the Conservatives around
four seats.
The bias against the Conservatives, therefore, does not
arise solely, or even primarily, from constituency
malapportionment, but from three other factors –
differential turnout, differential concentration of the vote
and the differential effects of tactical voting. These effects
cannot be corrected by any boundary review, however
efficient.
Under the first past the post electoral system, the
number of seats which a party wins will depend not only
upon how many votes it receives, but also upon how that
vote is distributed geographically. A party whose vote is
more concentrated will in general win more seats for a
given share of the vote than a party whose vote is more
evenly spread.
Electoral bias, therefore, cannot be wholly eliminated by
reform of the rules under which the Boundary
Commissions operate. Supporters of this reform
exaggerate its likely benefits.
FIXED-TERM PARLIAMENTS
The coalition’s Programme for Government declared:
“We will establish five-year fixed-term Parliaments. We will
put a binding motion before the House of Commons stating
that the next general election will be held on the first
Thursday of May 2015. Following this motion, we will
legislate to make provision for fixed-term Parliaments of five
years.”
A precondition for the formation of the coalition was
control over the dissolution of Parliament. Otherwise the
Prime Minister would have been able to secure a snap
dissolution at a favourable moment for his party, breaking
up the coalition, at the expense of his coalition partners.
Amongst western European Parliamentary systems,
however, all of which apart from France use a system of
proportional representation to elect their lower house,
Norway is the only country that makes provision for fixed-
term Parliaments, the Parliamentary term being four years.
This, however, causes considerable difficulty when a
government is defeated on a confidence vote in the middle
of a Parliamentary term as has happened on three
occasions in Norway in the last 30 years. Switzerland also
has a fixed-term Parliament, but it is not strictly a
Parliamentary system since the executive is drawn from all
of the main parties in the legislature, rather than solely
from the majority party or parties, and is not responsible
to it.22
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But the Fixed-Term Parliaments Act is misnamed. It
does not provide for fixed term Parliaments on the
Norwegian model, although it does make dissolution more
difficult and no longer at the discretion of the government
of the day.
The Bill provides two methods by which an early
dissolution can be secured. The first is when two-thirds of
MPs vote for it. In the current Parliament, this means that
both Conservative and Labour MPs would have to support
a dissolution.
The second method of securing an early dissolution
occurs if, after a vote of no-confidence in the government,
no alternative government can be formed within 14 days.
This provision is similar to that regulating the Scottish
Parliament in the Scotland Act, 1998, with two exceptions.
The first is that, in Scotland, the Parliament is given 28
days to nominate a First Minister. The second exception is
that, in Scotland, if there is an early dissolution, the
election that follows is termed an “extraordinary general
election”, and the “ordinary general election” held after
four years still takes place. Thus, if the Scottish Parliament,
elected in 2007, had been dissolved in 2009, there would
still have been another election in 2011. (The only
exception to this provision occurs if the “extraordinary
general election” is held within six months of the date of
the “ordinary general election.” In these circumstances,
the ordinary general election is not held: Scotland Act,
1998 and see, in particular, ss 3(1)(a) and (b) and s 46).
The provision that any general election held after a vote for
dissolution or vote of no-confidence is an “extraordinary
general election” which does not affect the normal cycle,
has the effect of lessening the potential advantage of an
early dissolution for an incumbent government.
But the coalition did not adopt the Scottish provision.
This means that a mid-term dissolution initiates a new five
year term. If the mid-term election is held earlier in the
year than May, the next general election is held four years
later; if later than May, five years later. Thus, a mid-term
dissolution held in February 2012 would mean that the
next general election would be in May 2016; but a mid-
term dissolution held in October 2012 would mean that
the next general election would be in May 2017.
An early dissolution, so it is argued, represents an
illegitimate attempt by a Prime Minister to gain an
advantage from the temporary popularity of his
government. But there are respectable reasons for an early
dissolution. The first is when a new Prime Minister seeks a
personal mandate, as with Sir Anthony Eden in 1955.
Some felt that Gordon Brown should have sought such a
mandate in 2007. Indeed, in April 2010, shortly before the
general election, David Cameron proposed that a new
Prime Minister should go to the country within six months
of being appointed (Independent, 24 April, 2010).
A second reason for an early dissolution might be to seek
a mandate for a new policy, as with Baldwin who, in 1923,
dissolved a Parliament that was just one year old, in an
unsuccessful attempt to secure a mandate for a protective
tariff; or with Edward Heath in February 1974, who, again
unsuccessfully, sought a mandate to deal with the miners’
strike and changed economic conditions resulting from the
quadrupling of oil prices after the 1973 Yom Kippur war.
A third reason for an early dissolution might be that the
existing Parliament is unviable, as with the 1950-51
Parliament, the 1964-6 Parliament or the February-
October 1974 Parliament, when governments lacked a
working majority.
A fourth reason might be if there were a change of
coalition partners in the middle of a Parliament when it
could be argued that the electorate should be given the
chance to pronounce on this change of government.
These four motives for early dissolution are by no means
unworthy.
The Fixed-Term Parliaments Bill was introduced as a
reaction to the expenses scandal. But the main problem
that appears to have been raised by the expenses scandal
was the need to secure greater control over MPs who, so it
was alleged, had become insensitive to the reactions of
their constituents. If the Fixed-Term Parliaments Bill has
any effect, however, it would be to insulate MPs from
popular pressures by ensuring that dissolution became
more difficult and general elections less frequent.
The debate about the Fixed-term Parliaments Act
indicates a conflict between two fundamental principles,
the principle of Parliamentary government and the
principle of democratic government. The former principle
provides that Parliament shall choose the government,
which is accountable to it, the second that the people
should choose the government, and that government
should be accountable to them. Normally, of course, under
single-party majority government, the norm since 1945,
though not before 1939, the two principles coincide. But
if, as is possible, we are moving into an era of multi-party
politics, then the principles will come to diverge.
If we are entering a world of hung Parliaments, it by no
means necessarily follows that dissolutions should be made
more difficult. Indeed, it can be argued that they should
become more frequent since changes of government in
mid-Parliament are more likely to occur in a multi-party
system than under a two-party system where coalitions are
unnecessary. While a democracy cannot survive on an
endless diet of dissolutions, making dissolution too
difficult could lead to endless Parliamentary manoeuvring
of the sort which so discredited the Third and Fourth
Republics in France. Dissolution, then, is not necessarily a
threat to good Parliamentary government, but can instead
be one of its most important safeguards by ensuring that
governments are accountable not only to Parliament but
also to the electorate. In Third Republic France, in 1902,
Prime Minister, Waldeck-Rousseau declared: “the ability to 23
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dissolve — is not a menace to universal suffrage, but its
safeguard. It is the essential counterbalance to excessive
Parliamentarism, and for this reason it affirms the
democratic character of our institutions” (quoted in B S
Markesinis, The Theory and Practice of Dissolution of Parliament,
Cambridge University Press, 1972, p 234).
CONCLUSION
The coalition exemplifies the principle of Parliamentary
government rather than the principle of democratic
government, in that neither the formation of the
government nor the coalition agreement could be
endorsed by the people; while the constitutional reforms
proposed by the coalition might well serve to insulate
Parliament still further from the people.
Perhaps, therefore, the constitutional reforms of the
coalition need to be counter-balanced by reforms designed
to open up the political system not further to insulate it.
There is a profound conflict between the politics of
Parliamentarism and the politics of a democratic age. So
the constitutional changes proposed by the coalition will
not end the era of constitutional reform. That era will
come to an end only when our political system has come to
be congruent with the public philosophy of the age, when
the forms of the constitution come to be congruent with
the predominant forces animating society.
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